From the current Apps of shared bicycles, since the registration uses the real-name system, the correspondence between data and people is inevitable. To limit personal data from being abused or leaked, it can only rely on corporate self-consciousness and self-discipline.
Obviously, relying on self-discipline is very unreliable. Mobike, ofo, and other shared bicycle apps, the performance is not satisfactory. Privacy policies are lacking and security measures are worrying. For example, once there was a female hacker, she broke the high-risk vulnerabilities in just one minute. She said, “this loophole has very little threshold, and it is too easy to hack them.” This kind of event shows us that shared bicycle companies have become important targets for hackers.
For shared bicycle companies, travel data is very useful. But it is mainly useful in the information presented by a large amount of data, rather than on the data of a single user. Therefore, mastering such a large amount of user’s personal privacy information is actually not a high-quality “asset” but a high-risk “liability” for shared bicycle companies.
There is no personal privacy issue in the traditional urban public transport industry. The reason is that there is no real-name system. That is, all traffic behaviors are anonymous. For example, although the transportation card system records travel information, it will not form privacy unless other channels are introduced to determine the relationship between the card and the user.
So, I think the basic issue is that the shared bicycle companies have both travel information and identity information at the same time, which turned information that could not be private into private information. And how are they going to proceed, storage and manage all these data, is still needed to be further discussed.